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I. Introduction 
 
Offender profiling involves the construction of a profile of the offender from the characteristics of the crime or 
crime scene. The objective of offender profiling is to assist law enforcement to identify and find the offender. 
The profile may also help law enforcement to provide more precise warnings to the public about the possibility 
and nature of future offences—to be alert to a particular type of individual or to be especially alert at particular 
times or places. There are a number of approaches to offender profiling and the emerging discipline of 
investigative psychology is a field very much characterised by rigorous debate. Whatever the outcomes of this 
debate may be, there is surely value in asking whether the concept of deriving offender characteristics from the 
characteristics of the crime is something to which economic science can contribute. This involves a logical 
extension of the ways in which economics is applied to criminal behaviour and amounts to asking the following 
question: Given information about a crime, can economics provide investigative advice? The answer is yes, it 
can. By extending the economic theoretical models of crime and terrorism, is the purpose of this paper to show 
how, in principle, economics can provide investigative advice to law enforcement involved in the pursuit of lone 
wolf terrorists.  
 
The ‘lone wolf terrorist’ has been selected for special attention in this paper because, in many respects, recent 
analysis of the lone wolf terrorist comes very close to providing investigative advice to law enforcement. The 
economics of terrorism is a combination of unique applications of economic theory—usually game theory and 
expected utility theory—and extensions of the economic theory of crime developed by Becker (1968) and 
Ehrlich (1973). Economic analysis of terrorism has generated a number of useful insights into the patterns and 
behaviours of terrorists. It has also swept aside some of the conventional wisdom that tends to be reflected in 
popular perceptions of terrorism. Phillips (2011), in an analysis of lone wolf terrorism, appears to go one step 
further in attempting to ‘ensnare’ the lone wolf within an analytical framework such that the lone wolf’s 
behaviour is not only explained within a rational choice framework but, with reference to a benchmark risk-
return matrix, anticipated in a manner that touches on providing investigative advice to law enforcement. With 
these theoretical ‘footholds’ established within the literature, lone wolf terrorism provides a practical starting 
place for a research program that may eventually extend to other types of illegal behaviours.  
 
The lone wolf terrorists that continue with their activities over time and evade capture by law enforcement 
exhibit the ‘serial’ offender behaviours that are most often the subjects of investigative psychology. Although it 
is, of course, possible to develop a profile of an offender from a single crime scene, the distinct style of the 
offender may become clear only after a series of crimes has been committed (Canter et al. 2004). As Canter et 
al. (2004, p.303) explain, the early crimes (usually the first and second) may be expected to be exploratory and 
may not reveal the offender’s distinct style. The offender may also develop skills and experience as a result of 
undertaking these exploratory criminal activities, especially through his interactions with the victim, the reaction 
of the victim and the nature of law enforcement reactions. If offenders have a style that can be classified 
according to a particular classification scheme or typology, this style may be more likely to emerge over a series 
of offences (Canter et al. 2004, p.303). The serial behaviour of lone wolf terrorists provides an appropriate 
context within which to explain the nature of economic profiling. The danger that lone wolf terrorists represent, 
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a danger that is recognised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is an additional factor that adds to the 
value of investigating the behaviour of these individuals. If economic science can contribute, even marginally, 
to the provision of investigative advice that assists law enforcement in the pursuit of lone wolves, the analysis 
will be amply justified.  
 
Apart from the possibility of extending the scope of economic analysis of criminal and terrorist behaviours and, 
potentially, assisting law enforcement in identifying, apprehending and curtailing the activities of these 
individuals, there is another way in which economic science may contribute to the body of knowledge that is 
accumulating around the concept of offender profiling. Snook et al. (2008, p.1260) argue that the 
(psychological) theory underlying offender profiling is weak. In some cases, profilers may be implicitly or 
explicitly adopting flawed theoretical frameworks or theoretical frameworks that are not well supported by 
empirical evidence. By contrast, the economic theory that would underlie ‘economic profiling’—profiling based 
on an expected utility theoretical framework—is both rigorous from a purely theoretical standpoint and 
supported by empirical work. As an example, consider Landes’ (1978) well-known study of hijacking. The 
expected utility model presented by Landes (1978) and based upon Ehrlich and Becker’s contributions to the 
economic analysis of crime, appears to be well-supported by Landes’ (1978) empirical analysis of hijacking and 
the reactions of hijackers to increased airport security and prison sentences. That part of an offender’s profile 
that may be constructed on the basis of economic analysis is likely to stand on relatively firm ground.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II, a review of the relevant literature is presented. 
The literature review concentrates on studies of offender profiling and investigative psychology. In Section III, 
the possibility of economic profiling is explored. This exploration relies upon extracting pieces of investigative 
advice from the ‘economic typology’ that is embedded within expected utility theoretical analysis of crime and 
criminal and terrorist behaviour. The ways in which an economic theoretical framework may complement the 
statistical approach to offender profiling that is deployed by investigative psychologists and profilers is 
discussed. In Section IV, this theoretical work is applied to the analysis of serial lone wolf terrorists in both the 
United States and Europe in order to show how economic analysis may provide investigative advice to law 
enforcement in particular cases. In Section V, conclusions are drawn and directions for future research are 
offered.  
 
II. Literature Survey 
 
A. What is Offender Profiling? 
Offender profiling is about drawing inferences about the offender from the crime and crime scene. More 
formally, A → C, where A are the actions that occur in and are related to a crime and C are the characteristics of 
the offender (Canter 2004, p.5). The drawing of inferences for C from A is encompassed within the symbol 
‘→’. This is where all of the scientific modelling and processes underlying offender profiling sit (Canter 2004, 
p.5). The scientific modelling and processes that are designed to facilitate the drawing of inferences for C from 
A now constitutes a relatively large literature that may be broadly classified under the emerging discipline of 
investigative psychology and offender profiling. The discipline and its main subject, offender profiling, have 
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relatively brief histories, though early examples of profiling can be found. According to Douglas et al. (1986), 
Canter (2004) and Alison et al. (2010), the origins of offender profiling are traced to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) Behavioural Science Unit in the 1970s where agents began to draw on all information 
related to a violent offence and, in combination with their investigative knowledge and experiences, draw 
inferences about an unknown offender. The process has since been popularised in movies and TV series, leading 
to an interesting situation of a science evolving alongside its popular counterpart. 
 
B. The Evolution of Investigative Psychology 
Alison et al. (2010) identify three different approaches to offender profiling: (1) the criminal investigative 
approach; (2) the clinical approach; and (3) the statistical approach. Each approach draws on a different type of 
‘knowledge domain’ on the basis of which inferences about the offender are drawn. The similarity between the 
approaches is the argument that it is possible to identify ‘reliable clusters of crime scene behaviours’ that may 
be used to develop taxonomic or typological classifications. These taxonomies or typologies may then be 
applied in each case to develop a profile or portrait of the offender given the characteristics of the crime and 
crime scene. The criminal investigative approach, developed by the FBI in the 1970s, traditionally combined 
information about a violent offence and investigative knowledge to develop an offender profile. This mixture of 
tacit knowledge and experience has been developed into a more formal set of typologies that are, in principle, 
empirically falsifiable (Alison et al. 2010, p.117). The clinical practitioner approach, like the criminal 
investigative approach, has traditionally been a mixture of experience and tacit knowledge but from a clinical 
practitioner’s knowledge-experience base rather than a law enforcement knowledge-experience base. Finally, 
the statistical approach is characterised by the application of various statistical techniques (especially spatial 
analysis) to information concerning crimes and crime scenes with the objective of both developing and 
empirically testing the validity of classification schemes or typologies (Alison et al. 2010).   
 
As these three approaches have merged, blended and been subjected to careful analysis over two decades, 
offender profiling has, according to Alison et al. (2010) become a broader multidisciplinary approach to the 
provision of behavioural investigative advice (BIA). This evolution has not been characterised by a complete 
replacement of the tacit knowledge of investigators and clinical practitioners with scientifically rigorous 
typologies and methodologies. Rather, it seems that a scientifically based but pragmatic approach to determining 
the best methodology with which to construct behavioural investigative advice has come to characterise the field 
of offender profiling and investigative psychology (Alison et al. 2010, p.127). The state-of-the-art in offender 
profiling is a much more informed and rigorous discipline based on theoretical and practical knowledge and 
experience. With more clearly defined and sounder theoretical foundations permitting the application of 
informed statistical analysis, offender profiling has matured into a more scientific discipline that, at the very 
least, has been able to put forward some evidence-based methodologies for the provision of behavioural 
investigative advice. As one would expect, however, the processes by which inferences may be made about the 
offender from characteristics of the crime and crime scene and the validity of various contributions from theory, 
investigative or clinical experience and empirical-statistical studies are still the subject of much debate.   
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C. Approaches to Inference 
One aspect of investigative psychology that is subject to strong debate is the approaches to inference. The 
transition from A to C, involves some process. In the early stages of the development of investigative 
psychology this process was somewhat more characterised by the drawing on of tacit investigative or clinical 
knowledge. As investigative psychology and offender profiling developed as an academic discipline, a number 
of models and processes emerged to provide structure and rigour to the process of developing inferences about 
an offender from actions that occur in or are related to the crime. Canter (2004, p.5) lists five possibilities: (1) 
Personality theory; (2) Psychodynamic theory; (3) the career route perspective from criminological theory; (4) 
social processes; and (5) Interpersonal narrative theory. Traditionally, the dominant process has been some 
application of personality theory though, as Canter (2004) explains, the other processes by which inference 
about the offender may be made have recognised value. As offender profiling extends beyond the personality 
profile of the offender to a ‘geographic’ profile—designed, for example, to locate the offender’s likely place of 
residence—other processes and models become applicable (O’Leary 2009). In fact, the choice of models and 
methods, each based upon particular psychological models, is quite large. Goodwill et al. (2009), for example, 
examine three such models: (1) the FBI’s Power and Anger Model; (2) Canter et al.’s (2003) Behavioural 
Thematic model; and (3) the Massachusetts Treatment Centre’s Rape classification system. Each approach again 
reflects the different perspectives of the investigators and researchers concerned. The goal, in each case, is the 
same. This is the classification of offenders in order to prioritise suspects (Goodwill et al. 2009).  
 
D. The Importance of a Classification Scheme or Typology 
The classification of offenders to a particular ‘type’ lies at the heart of the problem of drawing inferences about 
an offender from the characteristics of a crime or crime scene. As Canter (2004, p.8) explains, “A recurring 
consideration in the emerging investigative psychology literature is therefore the development of classification 
schemes, often in the form of typologies, into which offences and offenders can be assigned.” If the crime or 
crime scene can be classified as a particular type, the offender will have the characteristics associated with that 
type. Canter (2004, p.8) identifies two critical assumptions that underlie the typologies: (1) within each type, the 
characteristics that define that specific type are likely to co-occur with one another with regularity; and (2) 
specific characteristics of one type are assumed not to co-occur with the characteristics of an alternative type. 
The development and empirical testing of these typologies constitutes a relatively large part of the investigative 
psychology literature. Although only limited empirical support for typologies has been found, the spatial 
analytical methods deployed in the analysis of crime scene characteristics have generated a large amount of 
information that will need to be assessed and reassessed as debate about the underlying psychological-
theoretical models continues.  
 
As may be expected, however, from a field that is both scientific and pragmatic in nature, a dominant typology 
retains a place of prominence within both the academic literature and law enforcement practice even in the 
absence of strong empirical-statistical support. This is the organised/disorganised typology. The 
organised/disorganised typology is identified by Canter et al. (2004, p.293) as one of the “most widely cited 
classifications of violent, serial offenders.” This is probably due to the fact that although direct empirical 
support for the organised/disorganised typology is weak, empirical investigations of this and related typologies 
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have revealed at least some support for the possibility of using crime and crime scene information to analyse the 
‘themes of actions’ and linking these ‘themes’ to the characteristics of the offender (Salfati and Canter 1999, 
p.405; Canter 1994). This is mirrored in a detailed empirical investigation of the organised/disorganised 
typology undertaken by Canter et al. (2004) in which the authors found that serial murders were almost always 
characterised by a particular subset of organised characteristics. No evidence was found for a ‘disorganised 
type’ with disorganised features having far lower frequency. Although support for an organised/disorganised 
dichotomy was weak, the analysis revealed that rather than a simple dichotomy, serial offenders may be 
distinguished by the ways in which they are disorganised. If all serial murderers exhibit similar organised 
features but particular disorganised features, there may be structure conducive to some typology embedded in 
the different ways in which serial killers exhibit disorganised aspects of their activities (Canter et al. 2004, 
p.313). These ‘glimpses’ of structure appear to have been sufficient, when combined with investigative 
knowledge, to ensure the continued utilisation of the organised/disorganised typology within law enforcement 
agencies.  
 
E. Other Typologies and Empirical Analysis 
Investigative psychology and offender profiling is about making inferences: A→C. The ‘inference processes’ 
represented by ‘→’ are based upon a variety of different psychological models which inform a classification 
scheme or typology that is designed to place an offender in a particular ‘type’ in order to prioritise suspects and 
assist law enforcement with investigation. As we have seen, there are a variety of psychological models and 
classification schemes extant in the investigative psychology literature and the ones that we have covered far 
from exhausts the complete list. Part of the investigative psychology literature is devoted to empirical testing of 
the various models and typologies and their underlying assumptions (for example, Salfati and Canter 1999; 
Mokros and Alison 2002; Dabney et al. 2006; Goodwill et al. 2009). Another related part of the literature is 
devoted to identifying ‘structure’ within A to further guide the construction of typologies. Interestingly, an 
important part of this endeavour is the deployment of multivariate analysis and, in particular, spatial analytical 
techniques (for example, Canter et al. 2004; Häkkänen et al. 2004; Häkkänen 2006; Goodwill et al. 2009; 
Chambers et al. 2010; and Zaitsu 2010). The available evidence appears to support the possibility of offender 
profiling but this is certainly not a unanimous position within the investigative psychology and offender 
profiling literature. 
 
F. Is Offender Profiling Possible? Criticisms and Caveats 
“There is a growing belief that profilers can accurately and consistently predict a criminal’s characteristics based 
on crime scene evidence. This increased belief is evident from the fact that [offender profiling] is becoming 
prevalent as an investigative technique, that positive opinions of [offender profiling] are being communicated in 
the published literature and that police officers and mental health professionals support the use of [offender 
profiling]” Snook et al. (2008, p.1270). Snook et al. (2008) argue that there is an absence of ‘compelling’ 
scientific evidence that offender profiling is reliable, valid or useful. The authors argue that the belief that 
offender profiling ‘works’ is an illusion deriving from the mixture of fact and fiction that has characterised 
offender profiling since its inception. Simply, the anecdotal evidence in favour of offender profiling is given too 
much weight relative to the scientific-empirical support for offender profiling. This has led to the premature 
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acceptance of offender profiling as an investigative technique (Snook et al. 2008, p.1270). The authors argue 
that this is pernicious given the possibility that a method that is theoretically and empirically lacking in support 
may mislead investigators, hinder the investigative process and lead to wrongful convictions (Snook et al. 2008, 
p.1270). Snook et al. (2008) do not deny the possibility of offender profiling but direct their critique at the 
adoption and application of an approach that requires much more analysis and try to explain why offender 
profiling has gained widespread acceptance in the absence of compelling theoretical and empirical support. 
They conclude that, while offender profiling may be possible, more research is required (also see Snook et al. 
2007).  
 
Of course, a critical approach to all evidence is a hallmark of good science. The offender profiling literature and 
the scientific evidence (one way or the other) that it documents has emerged alongside both a popular 
conception of offender profiling and an evolution in the practical application of offender profiling that is at once 
both pragmatic and scientific. The result of all of this is that particular aspects of offender profiling—for 
example, particular typologies—have demonstrated weaknesses while simultaneously the same studies find 
structure within the available crime and crime scene data. Alongside this scientific evidence rests the knowledge 
and experience of law enforcement officers which, when combined with scientific evidence and theoretically 
guided approaches, may generate useful results. One approach to tying the loose threads of offender profiling 
together is embracing the pragmatic-scientific nature of offender profiling (Alison et al. 2010). As Snook et al. 
(2008) recognise, offender profiling might work and law enforcement continues to expand the deployment of 
the tool. A hiatus in this deployment pending further investigation is unlikely to be feasible. This is, however, 
not an unmanageable state of affairs. Scientifically-based pragmatism does not mean that offender profiling will 
not be guided by the available theoretical and empirical evidence. It means that, in practice, the deployment of 
offender profiling will probably not be constrained by it.  
 
G. Conclusions from the Literature: A Place for Economics and Rational Choice 
Several features that characterise offender profiling provide starting points for a contribution from economic 
science. First, although there is still much debate, the available evidence appears to point in the direction of 
some underlying structure to criminal activity. This is particularly the case for certain types of crimes. Second, a 
point of weakness in the process of offender profiling is the stability and rigour of the underlying theoretical 
framework. Although we do not expect economic science to provide a complete theoretical framework for 
offender profiling, the comparative rigour of the expected utility rational choice theoretical framework may 
contribute positively as a stable component of the overall theoretical structure underlying offender profiling. 
Furthermore, a typology or classification scheme derived from an expected utility rational choice theoretic 
framework would benefit from the rigour of the underlying economic theory. Third, there are almost certainly 
parallels between the statistical analysis that has come to characterise the ‘third-phase’ of offender profiling and 
the statistical-empirical analysis that is utilised in economic science. There is no reason why economic science 
cannot contribute to the development of offender profiling by providing an additional viewpoint from which to 
analyse and interpret the results of the types of multivariate statistical and spatial analysis undertaken within the 
field of investigative psychology. Even if the contribution of economic science must be pragmatic-scientific in 
nature, even marginal contributions to the efforts of law enforcement may be useful.  
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In principle, economic profiling or the drawing of inferences for an offender from crime and crime scene 
information on the basis of an inference process based upon an economic theoretical framework and an 
associated economic typology is possible because of the structure exhibited within the crime and crime scene 
data. Where there is motivated action that is not completely random, economic science can provide an 
explanation for at least a part of that action. Further support for this contention is to be found within the 
investigative psychology literature where there is some evidence to suggest that a ‘rational choice’ approach 
may be beneficial and may both overcome some of the problems associated with other inference processes of 
offender profiling and link together some of the approaches to offender profiling. Beauregard et al. (2007) 
develop an approach to offender profiling that views criminal action in terms of a ‘hunting process’, which 
includes hunting patterns (see Rossmo 2000) and cognitive, behavioural and geographic aspects of the crime 
(Beauregard et al. 2007, p.1070). The hunting process guides the development of a classification scheme or 
typology in the form of a ‘script’. The provision of investigative advice is based upon these ‘hunting process 
scripts’ which may be compared with the crime and crime scene evidence in order to determine the type of 
individual responsible for a particular series of crimes.   
 
One of the apparent advantages of the rational choice, hunting process, approach to offender profiling is its 
capability at handling cognitive and behavioural factors as well as situational factors. As Canter (2004) noted, 
the task of constructing a geographic profile for an offender may require the application of inference processes 
that differ from those used to construct a psychological profile. Beauregard et al. (2007) encompass hunting 
patterns, cognitive, behavioural and situational variables within rational choice-based hunting process scripts 
that may be used as the basis for constructing a more complete offender profile. An approach to offender 
profiling that is based upon economic science may extend these results by the deployment of a more rigorous 
theory of rational choice: expected utility theory. The apparent structure of criminal action, the open debate that 
characterises the field of investigative psychology and offender profiling and the multidisciplinary nature of the 
exercise provide an opportunity for a contribution from economic science. Undertaking to provide such a 
contribution may also extend the ways in which crime and criminal behaviour is analysed within economics. 
Even if the ideas are necessarily embryonic at first, it would be very useful to show that economic science is 
capable of providing some form of investigative advice.  
 
III. An Economic Approach to Developing an Offender Profile 
 
We shall explore two economic approaches to developing an offender profile. Both are based on traditional 
economic analysis and substantive rationality. However, in making recommendations for future research we 
shall recommend exploring an alternative approach based on Herbert Simon’s procedural rationality (see for 
example, Simon 1978). Of course, there are likely to be other possibilities and many extensions to the 
approaches that are presented in this section. When it comes time to provide some directions for future research, 
some of these other possibilities and extensions will be pointed out. Because the context of this analysis is lone 
wolf terrorism, other ways of approaching the construction of an economic profile may naturally emerge when 
other contexts are carefully analysed. In this section, the expected utility theory that underlies the analysis of 
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crime and terrorism is the starting point for an analysis that generates a number of pieces of investigative advice. 
This general formal analysis is examined within a particular empirical context in the following section where 
some well-known lone wolf terrorists are studied in light of the investigative advice generated by economic 
science.  
 
A rational economic actor ranks possible choices according to their expected payoffs. A formal way of 
representing this preference ordering is by the agent’s utility function. The arguments of the utility function 
represent the factors that contribute positively or negatively to utility. In the presence of uncertainty, the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (NM) expected utility (EU) function weights the possible outcomes of risky choices. 
The rational agent chooses among possible choices in a manner that maximises expected utility. This is different 
from saying that the agent maximises his or her expected payoff. Very risky choices with high payoffs may be 
accorded a lower expected utility than less risky choices with lower payoffs. The specification of the actor’s 
expected utility function and the risk preferences that are embedded within it will determine, in each case, 
whether the actor will make high risk or low risk choices. The arguments contained within the utility functions 
deployed in analytical work will depend upon the type of behaviour and scenarios being investigated. Phillips 
(2009; 2011) has deployed a utility function based upon two arguments: the mean or expected payoff of a 
particular risky choice and the variance or risk of that choice. This particular approach will agree exactly with 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for rational behaviour when the utility function is quadratic but has been 
shown to accord approximately with a large number of alternative specifications. The mean-variance approach 
has the added advantage of producing computable or numerical results rather than purely formal conclusions.  
 
A. Substantive Rationality: Standard ‘Economics of Crime’ Approach 
Although Becker’s (1968) work is better known, Ehrlich’s (1973) expected utility model of participation in 
illegitimate activities is a better starting point for the construction of an economic profile. Both Becker’s (1968) 
model and Ehrlich’s (1973) model share similar foundations and either could be used as the theoretical 
foundation for economic profiling but Ehrlich’s analysis contains threads that may be taken up in order to 
develop an economic framework capable of producing investigative advice. It is, therefore, the most expedient 
starting point. Like the investigative psychologists, the economists recognised that it was not possible to 
generate predictions regarding the outcome of objective circumstances from a theory of criminal behaviour 
based on a motivation unique to the offender (Ehrlich 1973, p.522). Ehrlich (1973, p.522) begins from the 
proposition that even if offenders differ systematically from law abiding citizens, they do respond to incentives: 
“Rather than resort to hypotheses regarding unique personal characteristics and social conditions affecting 
respect for the law, penchant for violence, preference for risk, or in general preference for crime, one may 
separate the latter from measurable opportunities and see to what extent illegal behaviour can be explained by 
the effect of opportunities given preferences” (Ehrlich 1973, p.522).  
 
Ehrlich’s (1973) model is relatively straightforward and, like most traditional economic analysis, is focussed on 
aspects such as wealth, resources and income. At first, this seems to reduce its relevance to ‘crimes against the 
person’ and terrorism. However, this may be circumvented in different ways. Within defence economics, 
analysis that is based upon this traditional economic theory of involvement in illegitimate behaviour, including 
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terrorism, is sometimes treated with the analytical concept of ‘wealth equivalents’ (see Enders and Sandler 
2002). This is the approach that is taken herein but we follow Ehrlich’s (1973) formalism. Ehrlich (1973) 
carefully constructs his analysis on the basis of the wealth equivalents generated by two types of activities: 
illegal and legal activities. In many ways, Ehrlich’s model is one based on negotiating a ‘time constraint’. The 
individual has limited time to spend on illegal and legal activities and non-market activities such as consumption 
and leisure. In this paper, we imagine a lone wolf terrorist who must decide how to divide his time between 
illegitimate terrorist activities and legal political activism.  
 
Ehrlich’s (1973) offender is one who faces a decision problem involving the optimal allocation of resources to 
competing activities—illegitimate and legitimate activities—under conditions of uncertainty. The activities are 
not mutually exclusive. For the purposes of this analysis, we shall describe our offender as an individual 
involved in the ‘illegitimate activity’ of lone wolf terrorism. Enders and Sandler (2002, pp.145-146) define 
terrorism as: Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal violence or brutality by 
subnational groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge 
audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence.” Phillips 
(2011, p.3) suggests: “A lone wolf terrorist engages in operations that are consistent with the definition of 
terrorism but does so outside of a formal command or organising structure. The lone wolf may or may not 
sympathise with a particular terroristic organisation and may not be motivated by a completely unique ideology 
or objective1.” The targeting of non-combatants or citizens is a defining characteristic of terrorism. Lone wolves 
may be particularly dangerous and, like other serial offenders, may be particularly adept at evading law 
enforcement. However, the lone wolf’s motivated action leads him directly into the analytical framework of 
economic science.  
 
The lone wolf, following Ehrlich’s (1973) expected utility theoretical framework, maximises the expected utility 
function: 
 
𝐸𝑈(𝑋𝑠, 𝑡𝑐) = (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑈(𝑋𝑏 , 𝑡𝑐) + 𝑝𝑖𝑈(𝑋𝑎, 𝑡𝑐) 
            (1) 
Subject to a time constraint: 
 
𝑡0 = 𝑡𝑖 + 𝑡𝑙 + 𝑡𝑐 , 
𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0; 𝑡𝑙 ≥ 0; 𝑡𝑐 ≥ 0 
            (2) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑠 is the stock of a composite market good (assets, earnings and real wealth equivalent of non-pecuniary 
returns from legitimate and illegitimate activity) (Ehrlich 1973, p.525) contingent on the state of the world 𝑠; 𝑡𝑐 
is the amount of time spent on non-market activity; 𝑡𝑖 is the amount of time spent on a risky illegitimate terrorist 
activity; 𝑡𝑙 is the amount of time spent on safe legal activity such as legitimate political activism; 𝑈 converts 𝑋𝑠 
                                                 
1 See Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007).  
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and 𝑡𝑐 into consumption flows. In a single period model, there are two states of the world, 𝑎 and 𝑏, giving the 
lone wolf 𝑋𝑎 or 𝑋𝑏 and the returns to the lone wolf are expressed by: 
 
𝑋𝑏 = 𝑊
′ +𝑊𝑖(𝑡𝑖) +𝑊𝑙(𝑡𝑙) 
            (3) 
𝑋𝑎 = 𝑊
′ +𝑊𝑖(𝑡𝑖) − 𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑖) +𝑊𝑙(𝑡𝑙) 
            (4) 
 
W denotes net returns (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) to each type of activity. Because illegitimate activities are 
risky, a failed terrorist action will be associated with a diminution in returns by amount 𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑖), which is the 
discounted pecuniary and non-pecuniary value of the penalty for the illegitimate activity and other related losses 
(Ehrlich 1973, p.525). This theoretical framework is usually used to draw conclusions about the direction and 
magnitude of response of offenders to changes in opportunities and law enforcement activity (see Ehrlich 1973, 
pp.522-523). The extension proposed in this paper is to utilise this theoretical framework to draw inferences 
about the offender from known characteristics of his terrorist actions. That is, to construct an offender profile on 
the basis of an underlying economic theoretical model that may be used to provide investigative advice to law 
enforcement in order to assist in the identification of the lone wolf and to provide specific warnings to citizens 
about the possible behaviour of the lone wolf.  
 
What are the types that emerge from this theoretical framework? What classification scheme emerges? The 
classification scheme or typology that emerges from a logical extension of Ehrlich’s (1973) economic 
theoretical framework is one based on the risk preferences of individual lone wolves, their actions under the 
time constraints that constitute an important component of Ehrlich’s theoretical work and their allocation of time 
and resources to market and non-market activities. An economic profile of a lone wolf terrorist would be 
constructed by ‘working backwards’ (or drawing inferences) from the lone wolf’s terrorist activities to the 
typology. Once the lone wolf’s activities have been linked with a particular ‘type’, the logical-economic 
theoretical framework should permit conclusions to be reached about the characteristics of the unknown lone 
wolf and his likely future actions. This is a process by which the lone wolf could be said to have been ensnared 
within an economic theoretical framework.  
 
A lone wolf who maximises the expected utility function expressed in Equation (1) will exhibit different choice 
behaviour depending on his risk preference and the lone wolf’s risk preference shapes, among other things, the 
time that is allocated to legitimate and illegitimate activities. Working backwards from the nature of the lone 
wolf’s terrorist activities, an economic profile of the lone wolf may be constructed that will fit the lone wolf to a 
particular type. The profile is based on a typology that must be constructed by first working forward from the 
theoretical framework to examine the types of activities that particular types of lone wolves will engage in. 
Starting from Equation (1) in an economic theoretical context characterised by two states of the world and a 
single period2, the first order conditions are given by Ehrlich (1973, p.526): 
 
                                                 
2 See Ehrlich’s (1973, p525), especially footnote six for a comment on multiple-periods.  
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𝜕𝐸𝑈
𝜕𝑡
− 𝜆 ≤ 0 
 
(
𝜕𝐸𝑈
𝜕𝑡
− 𝜆) 𝑡 = 0 
 
𝑡 ≥ 0 
            (5) 
 
Furthermore, Ehrlich (1973, p.526) identifies the optimal allocation of time between illegitimate and legitimate 
activities: 
−
𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤𝑙
𝑤𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖 − 𝑤𝑙
=
𝑝𝑈′(𝑋𝑎)
(1 − 𝑝)𝑈′(𝑋𝑏)
 
            (6) 
 
This time allocation between illegitimate and legitimate activities depends upon the risk preference of the lone 
wolf. At this point, we resort to the ‘wealth equivalents’ deployed so often in defence economics and examine 
the lone wolf’s time allocation under the assumption that engagement in terrorism yields a wealth equivalent, wi. 
The lone wolf is enticed by the payoffs to terrorism when marginal expected return to illegitimate terrorist 
activities exceeds that in legitimate political activities. For a lone wolf who is risk seeking this is a sufficient but 
not a necessary condition. For risk averse or risk neutral lone wolves, this is both a sufficient and necessary 
condition (Ehrlich 1973, pp.527-528). If it is assumed that this condition is met3, then the analysis can focus on 
the proportional allocation of time between the illegitimate and legitimate activities that characterises each of 
these types of lone wolves. We shall concentrate our attention on two ‘types’: the risk averse lone wolf and the 
risk seeking lone wolf.  
 
A.1. The First ‘Type’ of Lone Wolf 
The first ‘type’ of lone wolf is the risk averse lone wolf. The risk averse lone wolf will not spend as much time 
engaged in illegitimate activities as his risk seeking counterpart. He will certainly not be a ‘specialist’ terrorist 
and will be involved in other legitimate forms of political activism (or other types of activism if the objective is 
not a political one). In any given period, the risk averse lone wolf may engage in a series of illegitimate 
(terrorist) actions, providing that opportunities remain open to him and those opportunities for terrorism have an 
expected marginal return that exceeds that which characterises alternative legitimate activity. An alteration of 
the expected returns due to law enforcement action or enhanced security at potential targets may more readily 
deter the risk averse lone wolf from engaging in terrorism than it would his risk seeking counterpart. For these 
reasons, the risk averse lone wolf may space his terrorist activities well apart (in both time and geographic 
location) in order to remain within those ‘pockets’ that provide expected marginal returns in excess of those 
available to legitimate activities. The lone wolf will seek out these pockets up to the point that marginal benefits 
of the search equal the marginal costs4. Once the risk averse lone wolf attracts the attention of law enforcement 
                                                 
3 If the condition is not met, all empirically observed lone wolf terrorism must be undertaken by risk seeking lone wolves. 
4 This is a feature of the substantively rational economic agent.  
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and, perhaps, the popular press, he becomes especially elusive and may cease his terrorism for an indefinite 
period.  
 
From the crimes or crime scenes—the nature of the terrorist attacks—we can determine whether the lone wolf is 
of the risk averse ‘type’. Just like the investigative psychologists, however, this will probably only be possible 
after a series of two or three attacks (see above). A series of attacks that do not exhibit proximity in either time 
or geographic location is the first piece of evidence that may point towards the risk averse lone wolf. This is 
especially the case if, following the early attack (or attacks), law enforcement effort and security at similar 
targets has been visibly enhanced. It is possible that this enhancement has been reported on in the popular press. 
The risk averse lone wolf may be an individual that ‘drifts’ over relatively large distances seeking out those 
‘pockets’ where expected marginal returns to terrorism exceed those to legitimate activity. He is unlikely to hold 
steady employment, though he may spend considerable time engaged in legitimate forms of political activism. 
Again, this activism may ‘drift’ to various locations and should exhibit a correlation with the terrorist activities.  
 
At a higher level of specificity, the nature of the terrorist attacks may help to define the ‘type’ of risk aversion 
that the risk averse lone wolf exhibits which, in turn, may generate additional behavioural investigative advice. 
A risk averse lone wolf may exhibit decreasing, constant or increasing relative and absolute risk aversion5. As 
the lone wolf accumulates ‘wealth’ (measured as a wealth equivalent) by engagement in illegitimate terrorist 
activity and legitimate political activism over time, his allocation of time to these activities may change. If the 
risk averse lone wolf exhibits constant relative risk aversion, his allocation of time to terrorism relative to 
legitimate political activism will not change as his ‘successes’ accumulate. If the risk averse lone wolf exhibits 
increasing relative risk aversion, he will allocate less time to terrorism relative to legitimate political activism as 
his ‘successes’ accumulate. Economic analysis can provide guidance on the likely behaviour of a serial lone 
wolf. If the lone wolf is observed, after a series of successful terrorist activities, to curtail his activities or cease 
active terrorism altogether within a period, this is evidence of risk aversion and evidence that places the lone 
wolf within the ‘risk averse type’ (with the associated implications). If an assumption about relative risk 
aversion is made at the outset, law enforcement may be guided as to the expected behaviour of the lone wolf. If 
constant relative risk aversion is assumed, the risk averse lone wolf will continue to exhibit similar patterns 
following either successes or failures. If increasing relative risk aversion is assumed, the risk averse lone wolf 
will allocate less time to terrorism following a successful series of attacks. Once ensnared within the economic 
analytical framework, the lone wolf’s actual behaviour reinforces the economic profile or, alternatively, the 
economic profile is augmented with assumptions that permit the economic analytical framework to generate 
predictions about the lone wolf’s future activities.  
 
A.2 The Second ‘Type’ of Lone Wolf 
The second ‘type’ of lone wolf is the risk seeking lone wolf. Within the Ehrlich (1973) economic theoretical 
framework that underlies this part of the analysis, it is possible to say a number of things about the risk seeking 
lone wolf. For the risk seeking lone wolf to engage in terrorism, it is sufficient (but not necessary) for the 
                                                 
5 As wealth increases, relative risk aversion is reflected in the percentage of resources allocated to risky activities. Constant relative risk 
aversion implies the percentage remains the same. As wealth increases, absolute risk aversion is reflected in the absolute amount of 
resources allocated to risky activities.  
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expected marginal returns to terrorism to exceed those of legitimate activity. The risk seeking lone wolf will 
spend more time than his risk averse counterpart engaged in terrorism vis-à-vis legitimate political activity and 
might even specialise in terrorism. In any given period, the risk seeking lone wolf may engage in a series of 
terrorist activities. As law enforcement is intensified and security enhanced, the risk seeking lone wolf may 
intensify his terrorist activities. He is not as easily deterred as the risk averse lone wolf. For these reasons, the 
risk seeking lone wolf will focus his terrorism in a particular area or on particular types of targets. The terrorist 
activities are more likely to be in close proximity in time and geographic location (or by target type). He need 
not ‘drift’ far to look for opportunities where the expected marginal returns to terrorism exceed those of 
legitimate activities. Once the risk seeking lone wolf attracts the attention of law enforcement and the popular 
press, he may intensify his actions. It is a game to him. The risk is what drives him.  
 
From the crimes or crime scenes—the nature of the terrorist attacks—we can determine whether the lone wolf is 
of the risk seeking ‘type’. A series of attacks that is focussed within a particular time period, geographic location 
and target type points toward the risk seeking lone wolf. He is unlikely to be deterred and may be encouraged by 
law enforcement and popular press attention. Focussed attacks within the ‘search area’ are the work of the risk 
seeking lone wolf. He is bold but not reckless. His boldness cannot be relied upon to deliver the lone wolf to law 
enforcement. He will tease law enforcement by remaining close. He will not drift to other geographic locations 
in search of pockets where expected marginal returns to terrorism exceed the returns to legitimate activities. It is 
the risk that is his overwhelming desire and this risk is enhanced each time he engages in a successful terrorist 
activity and law enforcement moves closer and attention in the popular press becomes more intense. For all of 
this, the risk seeking lone wolf is elusive and difficult to locate. Unlike the risk averse lone wolf, the risk 
seeking lone wolf will probably not be engaged in other forms of political activism. He will not be an activist. 
He will not attend protests, demonstrations or rallies. He will not seek to actively promote a political message 
either online or through other forms of communication. He is close to the scene of his terrorist activities but 
until his next attack or his next attempt to taunt law enforcement, he will be invisible.  
 
B. Substantive Rationality: A Risk-Return Approach 
Within the investigative psychology literature, quantitative analysis of crimes, crime scenes and offender 
histories and behaviours has become an important part of the search for a framework that will permit sound 
inferences to be drawn about an offender from the characteristics of the crime scene. This type of approach is 
important if we wish to make more quantitative inferences about an offender. For example, the offender is likely 
to reside within a 40 mile radius of the crime scenes. Within an economic profile, risk and return play a critical 
role. Although we have been able to show that the economist may be able to say a number of useful things about 
the lone wolf, a standard economics of crime approach to the development of an offender profile will need to be 
supplemented if we are to first determine how risky the lone wolf’s terrorist activities have been and, from that 
starting point, develop behavioural investigative advice that is more quantitative in nature. We might also be 
able to rely less completely on the idea of wealth equivalents. This involves attempting to extract behavioural 
investigative advice from Phillips’ (2011) analytical framework. Together with a standard economics of crime 
approach, the two economic theoretical frameworks will deliver several pieces of behavioural investigative 
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advice that may prove to be useful additions to the advice that may be generated by the investigative 
psychologists.  
 
Phillips’ (2011) framework may be summarised as follows. It is a mean-variance theoretical framework where 
the lone wolf is assumed to optimise an expected utility function that is characterised by two arguments: risk 
and return. Because recent evidence suggests that lone wolves with an Islamic-Fundamentalist objective 
undertake terrorist activities with the objective to maximise fatalities and injuries, Phillips’ (2011) starting point 
is the risk and return associated with this objective. This may be made more general by using the word 
‘optimise’ instead of ‘maximise’. The theoretical analysis remains the same but the lone wolf’s optimal level of 
fatalities may be just a single individual victim. It should also be noted that, in principle, the risk-return 
theoretical framework may be applied to a broad range of different objectives: press attention, law enforcement 
reaction and so on. The expected return of a terrorist activity is measured by the mean fatalities that have 
historically characterised such activities and the risk is measured by the standard deviation of fatalities around 
the mean6. This provides a statistical framework to complement the economic theoretical framework that is 
somewhat analogous to the ways in which multivariate statistical analysis complements the approaches of the 
investigative psychologists. The basis for this statistical framework is the means and standard deviations of the 
various types of terrorist activities identified by RAND (and the Global Terrorism Database). Refinement of this 
statistical framework is, no doubt, an important task for future research.  
 
Table 1 Statistical Summary 1967 to 2007 of Attack Methods 
 
Attack Method Variance Standard Deviation Average Annual Fatalities Per 
Incident 
Armed Attack 1.261 1.122 1.296 
Arson 0.565 0.7519 0.322 
Assassination 0.15 0.3877 1.045 
Hostage 135.79 11.653 3.62 
Bombing 28.311 5.32 4.604 
Hijacking 14.816 3.8491 1.566 
Kidnapping 0.113 0.3355 0.393 
Other 3.756 1.9379 0.473 
Unconventional 576.281 24.005 3.883 
Unknown 16.028 4.003 0.915 
 
The two ‘types’ of lone wolves may be treated within economic theoretical framework described by Phillips 
(2011). Although Phillips (2011) appears to generate what might be considered to be behavioural investigative 
advice, he does not do so explicitly. Furthermore, Phillips (2011) concentrates on the risk averse lone wolf and 
does not cover the risk seeking lone wolf in detail. The lone wolf, within this framework, optimises an expected 
utility function on the basis of two arguments, mean and variance (or standard deviation): 
 
𝑈 = (𝐸𝑅 , 𝜎) 
            (7) 
 
                                                 
6 This framework may be applied to a crime such as serial murder where the offender may expect a number of victims (perhaps just one) 
from an attack but with a chance (a risk) that the actual number may be different from this expectation. The metrics are mean and standard 
deviation. The relevant data may be obtained from law enforcement archives and may include number of attempted attacks, number of 
victims, number of survivors.  
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The exact specification of the utility function usually depends upon the nature of the analysis being undertaken. 
A quadratic utility function guarantees that any preference ordering undertaken on the basis of the mean-
variance criterion will be consistent with the NM axioms of expected utility. Despite some problems with the 
quadratic utility function, it will approximate a wide range of alternative utility functions and appears to perform 
well in empirical tests (see Elton et al. 2003, p.232; Kroll, Levy and Markowitz 1984; Levy and Markowitz 
1979; Meyer 1987). Given this, the starting point is a lone wolf who optimises a quadratic expected utility 
function. Once the results are extracted from this mean-variance theoretical framework, we move on to 
alternative specifications for the utility function. Again, the economic profile is concerned with the risk-averse-
risk-seeking dichotomy. 
 
B.1 The Risk Averse ‘Type’ of Lone Wolf: Mean-Variance Analysis 
Phillips (2009; 2011) demonstrates some of the calculations that are possible within a mean-variance expected 
utility framework. In this section, we shall take a more theoretical or qualitative approach and concentrate on the 
behavioural investigative advice that may be generated from the framework (which, in principle, can be 
supported by computable quantitative results). A risk averse lone wolf optimises an expected utility function of 
the following specification (see Elton et al. 2003, p.220) where 𝐹, for ‘fatalities’, has been substituted for 𝑊 
(wealth or wealth equivalent): 
 
𝐸[𝑈(𝐹)] = 𝐸(𝐹) − 𝑏{𝜎𝐹
2 + [𝐸(𝐹)]2} 
            (8) 
 
This utility function captures the idea that a lone wolf may expect or be aiming for a particular number of 
victims (perhaps just one victim). The standard deviation of the fatalities associated with the chosen attack 
method captures the idea that this expectation may not be met. There may be more or less victims than expected. 
For economic profiling, the investigative economist would determine the risk-return characteristics of the crime 
or illegitimate terrorist activity and from this analysis place the lone wolf into a risk averse ‘type’. This can be 
accomplished very simply by elimination. If, after a series of terrorist activities, the lone wolf has exhibited a 
tendency to avoid the riskiest attack types, the lone wolf is unlikely to be risk seeking and more likely to be risk 
averse. Here, a prediction from economic theory guides the classification of the lone wolf but just like 
investigative psychology, it can only do so on the basis of information about the crime or terrorist activity. 
Having established this aspect of the profile, a further step can be taken. If the risk averse lone wolf is 
characterised by a quadratic utility function—remembering that such a utility will approximate closely a broad 
class of other utility functions—he will be characterised by increasing relative risk aversion.  
 
From the crimes or crime scenes—the nature of the terrorist attacks—we can determine whether the lone wolf is 
of the risk averse ‘type’. The risk averse lone wolf will not be observed to engage in the riskiest activity or 
combination of activities (hostage taking and unconventional attacks). Although a risk averse lone wolf will take 
tremendous risk if it is appropriately rewarded, he will not usually be found to allocate all of his time to the 
riskiest activities. After a series of successful terrorist activities, the risk averse lone wolf who exhibits 
increasing relative risk aversion will reduce the amount of time and other resources that he allocates to 
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illegitimate terrorist activities. He may also become satiated after a small number of successful attacks. He is 
easily satiated and success may lead to his indefinite withdrawal from terrorist activity. Law enforcement has a 
small window of time to ensnare the risk averse lone wolf. He is prone to drift in search of pockets where the 
returns to terrorism exceed the returns to legitimate activity. In this way, the risk averse lone wolf is elusive. He 
will not taunt law enforcement. He will be found engaged in legitimate political activism at considerable 
distance from the location of his attacks. After a series of successes he may not engage in terrorism for a 
considerable time, if at all.  
 
B.2 The Risk Seeking ‘Type’ of Lone Wolf: Mean-Variance Analysis 
Within the mean-variance framework, the quadratic utility function—Equation (8)—for a risk seeking lone wolf 
will be characterised by a negative 𝑏 and a positive second derivative. The risk associated with the targets adds 
to the expected utility of the risk seeking lone wolf. The risk seeking lone wolf will be found inhabiting the 
highest risk terrorist activities, the point of maximum risk and expected return (see Tobin 1958, p.79). If this 
risk is measured by the historical standard deviation of the fatalities associated with terrorist attack methods, 
then the highest risk terrorist activities are hostage taking and unconventional attacks. In turn, it is the 
observation of these types of crimes or terrorist activities that point towards the risk seeking lone wolf. Each 
increment of risk increases the risk seeking lone wolf’s utility. He obtains satisfaction from taking risk. He 
desires it. He will not be interested in legitimate political activity. He will not be found engaged in 
demonstrations, rallies or other forms of activism. He will not drift looking for targets that promise returns that 
are commensurate with their risks. It is the riskiest of targets that entice him. He will taunt law enforcement. It is 
the terrorism that will define him. Apart from terrorist activity and his taunts, he is quiet. He will be found close.  
 
B.3 The Risk Averse ‘Type’ of Lone Wolf: Logarithmic Utility 
Different specifications of utility will provide additional insights. In considering an individual’s decisions under 
risk and uncertainty, the mean-variance framework is an alternative to a full expected utility analysis where, 
theoretically, each possible payoff to a terrorist activity is assigned a probability and then a choice is made 
depending on the expected utility (not expected payoff) of the activity. When a full expected utility analysis is 
undertaken, the logarithmic utility function is a popular choice of economic analysts. The logarithmic utility 
function displays certain properties, especially constant relative risk aversion, that may provide additional 
elements of an economic profile for a risk averse lone wolf. If the payoffs to terrorist activities are uncorrelated 
over time, the horizon of ‘multiplicative activities’ will not affect the lone wolf’s decision to engage in terrorism 
(see Elton et al. 2003, p.221). This behaviour comes with an additional insight. The risk averse lone wolf with 
logarithmic utility has very large aversion to losses (see Elton et al. 2003, p.221)7. Law enforcement attention 
that increases the chances of failure considerably will repulse the risk averse lone wolf (with logarithmic utility). 
He will not risk another terrorist action where he believes the attention of law enforcement is focussed. He will 
drift away. He will watch from a distance. He will resume his terrorism where he feels safer.  
 
 
                                                 
7 This has caused concern among financial economists. However, like some of the properties of the quadratic utility function, this concern 
need not necessarily spread to other types of economists. 
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IV. THEODORE KACZYNSKI AND FRANZ FUCHS: TWO LONE WOLVES 
 
Economic science can provide behavioural investigative advice. How valuable the advice is will be a question 
for future research. In order to provide some preliminary starting points for this broader research program, it will 
be useful to examine two well-known lone wolves in order to highlight aspects of their terrorist activity and 
other behaviour that economists may use to construct an economic profile. Two prominent lone wolves are 
Theodore (Ted) Kaczynski and Franz Fuchs8. Kaczynski is an American. Fuchs is an Austrian. Both lone 
wolves engaged in bombing campaigns over a number of years. Kaczynski was active in terrorism for twenty 
years. Fuchs was active for four years. Kaczynski mailed sixteen packages and letter bombs resulting in three 
deaths and 23 injuries. Fuchs engaged in several ‘sprees’ of attacks in addition to two individual or isolated 
attacks involving more than twenty bombs that left four people dead and fifteen injured. Because these two lone 
wolves were engaged in a series of attacks that could be identified as the actions of a single individual, their 
behaviour falls into a type of illegitimate activity that is the subject of profiling by the investigative 
psychologists. Both lone wolves were profiled during the ensuing man-hunts. The nature of these individuals’ 
terrorist activities may also be analysed from the point of view of an investigative economist.  
 
In the previous section, we have concentrated on the construction of a risk-averse-risk-seeking dichotomy that 
may be used in a manner analogous to the organised-disorganised dichotomy that is popular in investigative 
psychology to generate a profile for an offender. Risk preference is a factor that pervades the economic 
theoretical models of crime and terrorism. It will be an essential component of any economic profile though 
future research and development may reduce the prominence that it has been accorded in our prototype 
economic profile. Within the risk-averse-risk-seeking dichotomy and the economic theoretical framework that 
encases it, inferences may be drawn about a lone wolf terrorist from factors that describe the nature of the 
terrorist activities of the lone wolf. In the context of two lone wolves, Theodore Kaczynski and Franz Fuchs, the 
risk-averse-risk-seeking dichotomy is discussed in order to determine whether aspects of the terrorist activities 
of these lone wolves could have been used to assign either individual to one of our categories and, based on such 
a classification, whether the economic profile would have generated behavioural investigative advice that was, 
at least, not completely misleading. Given the current state of affairs within the investigative psychology 
discipline, such a conclusion for economic profiling would be an encouraging very small first step.  
 
Among the attack methods, bombing does not have the highest standard deviation. It is not the riskiest attack. It 
is, however, much more risky than many of the other types of attack methods. Both Kaczynski and Fuchs 
engaged in bombing. However, both lone wolves utilised a mixture of ‘letter bombs’ and hand delivered or 
planted devices. Letter bombing reduces the risk of being found at or linked to the scene may reduce the 
variance of actual outcomes from that which was expected by means of being directed to a particular individual 
or target. Both Fuchs and Kaczynski are highly intelligent and certainly capable of assessing the risk-return 
tradeoffs associated with their activities. Letter bombing might be considered to be a way to reduce the risk 
associated with bombing. It is also a way of ‘drifting’ to find pockets where the returns to terrorism exceed 
those of legitimate political activity, though the letter-bombing lone wolf need not actually move to a different 
                                                 
8 Details obtained from Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007).  
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location. If this is true, both lone wolves are starting to look risk averse. However, Fuchs and Kaczynski differ 
on one important point. Fuchs’ single deadliest attack was the result of a bomb he had planted in a public place. 
It was not targeted at a particular individual or organisation and he spent at least some time at the scene in order 
to set up the device. Fuchs is starting to appear less risk averse and more risk seeking.  
 
Like our risk seeking lone wolf, Fuchs did not have a significant program of legitimate political activity. Fuchs 
did not withdraw from terrorism or drift away, even after his deadliest attacks. His campaign was continuous, as 
if fuelled by the increasing attention his terrorist actions received. He was enticed by the risk. He taunted law 
enforcement. He sent them long letters. He embellished his activities by inventing a terrorist organisation 
(Bajuwarische Befreiungsarmee) of which he claimed to be a member and a messenger. He was close. 
Kaczynski is different. Like our risk averse lone wolf, Kaczynski produced a manifesto and actively pursued the 
legitimate task of conveying his ideas in writing. At one point, he declared that he would cease his terrorism if 
his manifesto were published. Kaczynski did not escalate his activities as he attracted law enforcement and press 
attention. He did not taunt them. After one deadly attack, Kaczynski ceased to engage in terrorist actions for a 
number of years. He faded away and was inactive for long periods. He was found far from the scene of his 
attacks in a remote location. One is close. One is far away. Both are exactly where the investigative economist 
expected.  
 
The investigative economist can infer a number of things about a lone wolf offender from the nature of his 
attacks and his other observable behaviours. The value that this may have for law enforcement investigations 
can only be ascertained by much future research. When individuals are making motivated choices aimed at 
achieving some objective, economic science has important insights to provide. This is all the more the case 
when intelligent individuals engage in illegitimate activities that by their very nature involve the assessment of 
risk and return. As a first step, the risk and return that characterises a terrorist activity is the most 
straightforward foundation on which to build an economic approach to profiling. Other behaviours are linked to 
the lone wolf’s risk preferences. Lone wolves are characterised by certain features of their involvement in 
terrorism and political activity. They either do or do not drift across different locations. They either do or do not 
cease to engage in terrorism after successes or failures. They either do or do not taunt law enforcement. Placing 
these behaviours within an economic theoretical framework and successfully using that framework to draw 
inferences about the lone wolf that may be relevant to law enforcement investigations is the next logical 
extension of the longstanding program within economic science of explaining the behaviour of criminals and 
terrorists.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Offender profiling involves making inferences about an offender from aspects of the crime or crime scene. The 
theoretical frameworks that permit these inferences to be made have been studied within the emerging discipline 
of investigative psychology. There is no reason, in principle, that economic science cannot contribute to this 
debate and, in particular, provide an economic approach to developing an offender profile. In fact, this is the 
logical extension of the now considerable literature dealing with the economics of crime and terrorism. Rather 
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than focus on how theoretical economic agents may react to incentives, however, an economic approach to 
offender profiling consists of working with real-world criminal evidence and the logic of the economic 
theoretical frameworks to generate behavioural investigative advice9. In this paper, we have proposed a very 
preliminary economic typology based on risk preference: a risk-averse-risk-seeking dichotomy. Given certain 
aspects of the risk-return tradeoffs that characterise particular types of terrorist attacks and terrorism vis-à-vis 
legitimate political activism, an expected utility theoretical framework constructed on the solid foundations laid 
by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) does provide a theoretical structure that permits the investigative 
economist to move logically from aspects concerning the nature of the individual’s crimes or terrorism to 
conclusions that may be relevant to those in law enforcement who seek to apprehend a perpetrator.  
 
In this paper, we have concentrated on lone wolf terrorism. This is a particular form of criminal activity and one 
that is very suitable to this type of analysis. Serial lone wolf terrorists make choices that are designed to achieve 
an objective. What we have done is to highlight the possibility that the manifestation of these choices in actual 
terrorist activity or legitimate political activism may permit the classification of the unknown perpetrator into a 
particular category. Once classified, the logic inherent in the choice theoretical structure may generate insights 
that go beyond the purely theoretical and, when applied to particular cases, may generate behavioural 
investigative advice. We have applied a substantive rationality approach throughout. However, Simon’s (1978) 
procedural rationality approach has much to recommend it. Of particular importance is Simon’s (1978) 
observation that how the individual makes a decision is as important as what decision is made. Computation is a 
scarce resource and individuals may need to weigh up the costs of further searching and of further computation 
against the necessity of making a decision. Since investigative psychology has proven itself to be open to new 
techniques and new approaches, one particularly interesting avenue for future research is the investigation of the 
relevance and utility of cognitive simulation in exploring the procedural rationality of offenders (see Simon 
1978, p.502). This is in addition, of course, to the further investigation of the contribution that can be made by 
economic science to the generation of behavioural investigative advice.  
 
  
                                                 
9 An analogy is the way in which a chess player may work with a computer to choose the best course of action. 
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